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It is fitting that the first article in this issue of South African Crime Quarterly (SACQ) speaks 
to the South African Police Service’s tackling of commercial crime. It is increasingly clear that 
corporate–political collusion poses a serious threat to South Africa’s democratic gains. In recent 
months journalists have started to pick through a trove of emails released in June, known as 
the #GuptaLeaks. In the process they have connected the dots between tens of thousands of 
exchanges among the notorious Gupta business family, managers of parastatals, government 
ministers and allies of President Jacob Zuma, including his son Duduzane. The emails paint a 
terrifying picture of state capture and abuse. 
The Gupta family has rubbished the leaks, which appear to have come from within its own 
business empire, but some implicated ANC cadres have confirmed their authenticity. Nonetheless, 
until late August, when the SAPS Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (better known as 
the Hawks) told Parliament that it was investigating aspects of the emails, little evidence in the 
public domain suggested that police or prosecutors were taking them very seriously. A week later, 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) head Shaun Abrahams confirmed to Parliament that the NPA’s 
specialised commercial crime unit was investigating Gupta-linked contracts and state capture 
more broadly.
Among the most important revelations in the #GuptaLeaks is strong evidence that R5.3 billion 
was paid to Gupta associates in kickbacks in 2014 locomotive deals between the South African 
parastatal Transnet and Chinese locomotive manufacturer, China South Rail (CSR). It seems that a 
Gupta friend, Salim Essa, used his company, Tequesta, to secure the contracts, together with Gupta 
associates at Transnet. A fee of R10 million for every R50 million locomotive purchased was included 
in the contract to be paid to Tequesta, simply for introducing CSR to Transnet.1
In another revelation, a Gupta-owned company, Estina, was paid R84 million and granted a fee-
free lease of thousands of hectares of land near Vrede in the Free State. The deal was ostensibly 
intended to drive agricultural empowerment projects for residents, but instead the money appears 
to have landed up in the United Arab Emirates, from where it was funnelled back to South Africa 
through and into other Gupta-owned companies.2 The deal was facilitated by current Minister of 
Mineral Resources Mosebenzi Zwane, who at the time was the Free State MEC for agriculture. 
Separately, but as suspiciously, Zwane launched a new mining charter in June this year, calling for 
rapid ‘empowerment’ in the sector. While few would dispute the need for South Africa’s mining 
sector and economy at large to transform, Zwane’s brash move resulted in the loss of R50 billion in 
JSE-listed mining stocks (a matter touched on in Mbekezeli Mzhize’s article in this issue), possibly in 
part due to his questionable character and motivations in light of the #GuptaLeaks.3
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Both revelations – the locomotive and agricultural deals – hint at the degree to which business 
people and politicians, many linked to Gupta and Zuma networks, have colluded to fleece the 
South African fiscus in recent years. What’s more, the emails confirm suspicions that the Guptas’ 
Oakbay Capital employed British public relations firm Bell Pottinger to craft strategies to defend the 
Zuma and Gupta families and their allies from mounting accusations of state capture.4 Beginning 
in early 2016, Bell Pottinger staff wrote speeches and prepared talking points for Gupta and Zuma 
allies, which were in turn spread by Gupta-owned media outlets and Twitter bots in an enormously 
powerful ‘fake news’ operation.5 The firm charged over R1.5 million a month as a retainer for its 
divisive services. 
In early September, following a formal complaint by the Democratic Alliance, Bell Pottinger was 
expelled by the United Kingdom’s Public Relations and Communications Association, ditched by 
shareholders, and widely condemned, including in the British Parliament and by the British High 
Commissioner to South Africa, for running a racially divisive campaign that has damaged British 
relations with South Africa. And yet, while the global public relations firm crumbles, its Gupta-Zuma 
clients carry on as before.
In part because of the #GuptaLeaks, and following a Constitutional Court ruling on the matter, 
Parliament on 8 August voted in a secret ballot in response to an opposition-led motion of no 
confidence in Zuma. While an unprecedented number of ANC MPs voted with the opposition, Zuma 
survived yet again with 198 votes against the motion, 177 for, and nine abstentions. All eyes are 
now on the ANC’s December National Conference, which marks the end of Zuma’s term as ANC 
president, and thus perhaps the ANC’s last chance to get its house, and the country, in order.
This issue
It is hard, considering the consolidation of political and economic power revealed in the 
#GuptaLeaks, to imagine how South Africa’s criminal justice system will stem the looting of the state. 
But what about commercial crime on a more modest scale? In the first article in this issue, Trevor 
Budhram and Nicolaas Geldenhuys use SAPS performance data to suggest that the SAPS is losing 
the battle against even relatively minor commercial crime. With a focus on detection rates, they 
convincingly argue that the SAPS performance is unjustifiably weak, and that this weakness is hidden 
behind the inclusion of unfounded and withdrawn cases, and the classification of whole dockets 
(which can include multiple charges) as single charges in its accounting systems. They suggest 
that this makes the SAPS look more efficient than it is, obscuring its inability to address commercial 
crime. In so doing, they add to a growing body of literature highlighting the pitfalls of performance 
targets in policing. 
Next, John Kole asks whether private security officers (PSOs) could better support the SAPS crime 
prevention mandate if they had more legal authority. To explore this question, Kole presents data 
from interviews and a survey carried out with senior private security and SAPS managers, as well as 
with operational officers. Current legislation limits PSOs from acting beyond their capacity as private 
citizens. To many it is obvious that more armed, uniformed men and women with the authority to 
stop, search and detain suspected law-breakers will reduce crime. However, Kole questions whether 
more police would mean less crime. Evidence from elsewhere in the world suggests that it would 
not.6 Furthermore, the proposal that PSOs be given more authority is not supported by the police or 
5SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 61 • SEPTEMBER 2017
private security managers he interviewed. Even if they did, do we really want to coerce and punish 
ourselves towards a more just South Africa? Our sentencing policies suggest that we do.
South Africa has harsh minimum sentences, supported by the logic that serious crime deserves 
serious punishment.7 As a result, South Africa’s 236 prisons, designed to accommodate 119 134 
inmates, in 2016 housed 161 984.8 In this issue, Emma Lubaale compares South African and New 
Zealand court decisions, asking whether South African courts can better balance custodial and 
restorative sentences. She suggests that South African courts perceive restorative justice sentences 
as weak, and shows that courts in New Zealand have used them to address serious crime. A 2015 
report from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University found that imprisonment in the 
US has had almost no effect on crime rates since the early 1990s.9 This is because once prison 
populations reach a certain level, imprisonment has diminishing crime deterrence returns. Surely 
this is true of South Africa, too? If so, Lubaale’s call for a balance between custodial and restorative 
sentences is one worth taking seriously. 
South Africa’s Child Justice Act (2008) promotes the principles of restorative justice for young 
offenders. But where can young ex-offers turn for support after serving a sentence? In his article, 
Sean Larner takes us inside the Rebuilding and Life Skills Training Centre (Realistic) in Gugulethu, 
Cape Town, and into the lives of some of the young ex-offenders who have been through its 
programmes. Using in-depth interviews, the article presents a case study examining the obstacles 
faced by young ex-offenders and the impact of Realistic’s aftercare programme on their lives. 
In our last research article, Cyrus Arwui, Victor Tshivhase and Rudolph Nchodu offer insight into the 
formulation of Design Basis Threat (DBT) statements for nuclear facilities. DBTs are recommended 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a methodology to secure radioactive sites. The 
higher the risk ascertained by the DBT, the more capable security systems must be. Referring 
to the formulation of a DBT for the Irradiation Facility at the Centre of Applied Radiation Science 
and Technology in Mafikeng, the article offers a fascinating insight into the types of data used and 
assumptions made in the formulation of a DBT, including what some might believe to be an over-
reliance on reported crime numbers (not rates) in nearby towns. This raises questions about the 
veracity of such DBT methodologies.
Finally, in a commentary and analysis piece, Mbekezeli Mkhize reviews the challenges and 
opportunities posed by illegal artisanal (small-scale) mining in South Africa. He argues that the forces 
that push migrant miners away from their rural homes, often in neighbouring states, and pull them 
towards illegal mining activities, can only be addressed through an integrated network-governance 
response, involving a multiplicity of actors and resources. 
I hope that you enjoy the issue.
A final word
This is my last issue as editor of SACQ. The experience has been a pleasure and an honour. I am 
immensely grateful for the support of former (wonder) editor, Chandré Gould, and the fabulous 
SACQ production team of Bea Roberts, Iolandi Pool and Janice Kuhler. I am also grateful to Chandré 
and Mark Shaw, former director of the Centre of Criminology at the University of Cape Town (UCT), 
for affording me this opportunity. I greatly appreciate all the technical support and encouragement 
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provided by Ina Smith, Susan Veldsman and their colleagues at the Academy of Science of South 
Africa, and for the wisdom shared by members of the SACQ editorial board.
Subsequent issues will be edited by Kelley Moult, Nolundi Luwaya, Diane Jefthas and colleagues at 
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